Tuesday 30 August 2011

BEREKUSO NI. ASHESI NI. GHANA NI.


Mist bathed campus
I was at Berekuso last Saturday. My mission was to attend the formal ribbon-cutting for Ashesi University’s freshly minted gleaming campus perched strategically broodingly atop one of Berekuso’s numerous hills. The atmosphere was pregnant with tones of expectations for Ghana ’s future and Africa’s tomorrow. The guests came from all over the world and included rightly the vice-president of the Republic of Ghana Mr. John Mahama(he looked dapper and natty in that suit; I wish he would appear often like that!). It seemed as if Nature itself had to also make her presence felt: the campus was bathed in floating gossamer-like mists while a lazy, light drizzle let loose now and then as the tightly cheorographed ceremony unfolded.
Guests take a tour of the Ashesi Campus
If in very recent memory in this our Republic a temple has been erected for Knowledge, Reason, Wisdom and Selfless Service this is it without dispute. Over $5million was literally given to Ghanaian architects and contractors to essentially play with and the result is this potent testament in brick, stone, steel and mortar to African genius which marries in titillating spatial artistry the traditional and modern in Ablade Gloverian finesse or better still El Anatsuian harmony. Who said Ghanaian genius has gone to sleep forever? Ashesi’s new campus is a fitting riposte to this view that even our leaders(politicos especially) have come to believe in. And if leadership -selfless, focused, strategic, futuristic, empathetic, intense, ethical, transformative and relentless - matters in unleashing the best Ghana and Africa can be Ashesi’s campus embodies this. Anguished by the threats to his country’s brain power base and with it the undermining of responsible leadership of her educated classes, Patrick Awuah(Ashesi’s founder and president) went to work with virtually nothing but his own savings and that of his wife Rebecca(an American). Enduring many travails including naysayers, doubters and mockers Patrick persevered and endured and fought on as he helmed his team(with the able support of friends and people of goodwill reflecting the best of the human spirit) to this significant juncture. But dreams must find fertile grounds; the Chief of Berekuso Odeefo Nana Oteng Korankye provided it. Nana Korankye abandoned a lucrative real estate project for the Ashesi dream. Who said chieftancy was an anachronism; a spent ancient institution content in eking out a parasitic, unproductive existence century after century and obfuscating our journey to our reasoned, chosen modernity? In Ashesi’s campus that view is concretely contested.
Patrick Awuah was thinking about tomorrow not himself. Nana ditto. So were all those who have labored and toiled and battled to raise this inspiring sign-post to Gha na’s greatness tomorrow via today. The World Bank through the International Financial Corporation chipped in some heavy resources too for this project. Our politicos are embroiled currently in a shouting match over the STX and $3billion loan from China. Rightly there must be value for money when we contract such loans and transparency in the terms of the contracts. But in the long run it is selfless leadership marinated in palpable integrity which will ensure that these loans transform our Republic. That is the greatest test. Loans must be paid back on time and used for the express purpose for which they were sought for ( in the interest of our people and our Republic). Ashesi’s new campus tells a profound story. May we all learn. Berekuso ni. Ashesi ni. Ghana ni. Africa ni.

PS: It is a cringing shame the way Prof. Frimpong Boateng has been treated. He should have left Korle-Bu on the wings of a great send off party drenched hopelessly in the choicest champagne. He embodies Ghanaian genius at its finest without a doubt.

(Lloyd G.Adu Amoah is an assistant professor at Ashesi University and the executive director at Strategy3, a strategy and public policy research and advocacy think-pad based in Accra.)

Wednesday 24 August 2011

Tro- Tro

I wrote this poem in 1997 when I was a fresh-faced, very innocent youth. It forms part of a manuscript of my writings I plan to publish. My Dad Yaw Adjei(one of the truest Ghanaian patriots I have ever known)insisted while his gleaming official cars (first a Pajero and then a Suzuki) sat in the garage that his children took the public transport system. The vehicles he reminded us time and time again were meant for national duties; service to the Ghanaian Republic not trifling junkets bordering on abuse across the city. And so it was that I was exposed most intimately to Ghana’s public transport system in Accra: its wretchedness; its indignity; its butchery and maiming capacity and curiously its humanity. My very good friend Kimathi Kuenyehia and I still reminisce on the occasions when literally marooned and trapped in snarling queues in Accra-Central our mastery of the art of shoving and maneuvering and pushing made all the difference in boarding a tro-tro. It’s been fourteen years down the road and not much has changed. How many decades more? After all it is to my mind an intellectual insult to our Republic ( and especially to Ghana’s elites)  that all we could offer our people is this grotesqueness in the 21st century! Enjoy!  

         

                                        Verse I
“Accra, Accra, Accra”
At the “Bus stop,” a surge forward
Unveils a mad scramble to Enter
A veritable scrap-heap on Four-wheels
“Four” “Four”, a command bellows
The Driver’s mate knows the score
Four is Four, you may be pencil thin
Or tubby and flabby as the Makola mummy.

                                         Verse II
It’s a weird world in here
A hotbed of forced labour
To sit “seats” must be skirted
Now and then seats are pushed,
Shifted, lifted, hugged, even caressed
As if in tandem, man and woman
Oscillate their bodies into Positions
The Prague contortionist surely envies
Between man and woman intimacy physical Predominates
The Brother’s hands rub the sister’s breast
The sister’s buttocks rub the brother’s face
Thigh and Thigh, foot and foot
Communicate in an atmosphere sweaty
So much for Personal Freedom
The Ever present cliché
Of  Modern Ghana’s Political lexicon.

                                        Verse III
Time remains inconsequential
You are an Enemy
If watch looking is a habit
For movement is at a snail’s pace
What with fellow citizens jumping
Off now and then, here and there
And the Lord at the wheels
Chatting with a Buddy
Here and there, Now and then
Some Advice:
“Buy your own car,
If respect for Time is your credo:
Here Time has no meaning”
                                   
                                        Verse IV
In the Timelessness
A battle Rages
Fare payment inspired
Hear Prince Driver’s mate:
“  I have no change!
Your currency is torn”
Abuse, invectives, curses
Rule the Roost
Sometimes blood has flowed

Verse V

Along the Way
Men in black Extort
Men in black are bribed
The Law is mauled
And disabled
And too limbs if not lives lost
From Ashale- Botwe to Accra
Trapped in this rattle-trap
Forever or for a season
We wish we knew!


Sunday 21 August 2011

A Quip!!!!!


Last week I headed out to the Shai Hills area to meet some young people from Nigeria. The journey though a short one was quite relaxing. And such a feeling was aided in no small measure by the overwhelming lush greenery which calmed the senses (brutalized and abused by the daily frenzy of urban living). I loved nature’s artwork expressed in those craggy formations which swirled and twirled in multiple directions as if executing some esoteric contemporary dance move. Inevitably I     pondered over Ghana too. When, I thought, will the creative genius of the Ghanaian mind be unleashed to harness such neglected wealth for our collective advantage? The next generation becomes critical I thought as I watched those young Nigerians stream into the seminar room all feisty, chatty and innocent.
These youths (all teenagers) are from a high school which has decided to send its students to Ghana yearly for a tour of historical sites and leadership seminars. This was my third engagement as a motivation speaker with such youths from Nigeria. But why “small Ghana” as some of my Nigerian friends like to describe us? I asked them to share impressions of their stay. Their views both humbled and scared me. They loved our cuisine and our accents(when Ghanaians spoke English!) too. Our streets were almost surgical theatre clean. Electrical power was too surreally stable. Some wanted to come back to study in Ashesi University where I teach. Ghana was an oasis of progress for them. And in these statements they were echoing a sentiment a top Nigerian military officer friend of mine had expressed to me some years ago. I dismissed him then. Coming from these youths however got my mind into a spin to understand it all. Then that questioning quip from one gangling lad complicated it all: “ does Ghana face any problems at all?” I struggled to provide an answer to interlocutors who had made up their minds. My future Ghana I told them was one that could hold her own against the leading countries in the world on major economic and social indicators. Ghana’s rise it seems could provide such a compelling example for other African countries. That was humbling for me. However such supine adulation from other Africans for what for me (and many fellow compatriots from all walks of life I have spoken to over the years) are excruciatingly modest achievements could induce self –delusion. That scared me and the fact that some of Nigeria’s youth had concluded that their country had not lived up to her much vaunted potential.   
And  then last week London smoldered and then went up in flames. The youth again. In the global news. I remember the London I first saw. It was a rain soaked and windy October day. It was dark and overcast. That did not make the mood right. I was disappointed. The organization of space looked too staidly quaint for me. Still does after a couple of visits. My bad.  I have seen a few major Asian cities and been smitten by their scarcely hidden gusto and experienced as a bonus the warmth of total strangers on those streets. I love the sweep of some leading North American cities as well. But back to the point: why will youths set their city ablaze and go on a frenzied looting frolic? Is it seething anger stirred by hopelessness and a lack of opportunity? Cameron (himself quite youthful) and his team must find answers to such fundamental questions and cut the frothy, threatening, clichéd, criminalizing speeches which stripped of their veneer appear intent on protecting privilege and power. Maybe the youths of Tunis, Cairo, Damascus, Tripoli, Sanaa, Muscat, London, Lagos and Accra share the same pain after all in a world in which bankers and politicians filch billions, throw our lives into a tailspin and are glad handled and compensated to boot.


PS: Which Ghanaian official(s) chose the green hue for our biometric passports? It is so ugly. Can we please go back to the dark blue? On a lighter note I thought Nigeria held the patent for the  colour green? Oya!!!!!!!!!!!!!         
   

Thursday 11 August 2011

Roasted Plantain, Ongayo and the Sogakope “Vandals”?


The Great Volta in full majestic repose
Obesity may yet become one of contemporary Ghana’s key public health challenges. The post-industrial world has sprung upon us-while we napped- with its fast foods, canned stuff and sedentary life style. And it is the obese little ones who give me distress. My wife Sylvia and I refused to allow our little boy to stuff up on what children tend to crave and then get hooked on: fizzy drinks, candy and junk food. Thank goodness he is like a reed now and taking tae kwan do lessons too to keep those muscles working.  I make a conscious choice to eat our local foods regularly. I am not one of those who think eating greasy food every lunch time is hip or bourgeoise. I love my roasted plantain and crisp groundnuts. In the Accra afternoon when one pauses a while to savor life, the feel of roasted ripe plantain and groundnuts on the tongue and palate is heavenly for me.
And so lately I made a bee-line to this spot in Labone where I get my roasted plantain and groundnuts fix. I have become friends with this middle aged lady. We make small talk about family, life and Ghana’s future. She is not happy about her son who is good with his hands but not his brains at school. She wants my advice. I proffer some: Ghana has potential; the industrial machine will soon hum; craftsmen and women will be in high demand; there will be work and happiness; God dey. Woman marshals the sliced bits of plantain over that great fire sweetly and delicately; almost caressing those pieces with a sensuous artistry; she moves one there; shifts the other there; she is the overlord of a bewildering tapestry of smoke, live coal, searing heat, soot, gold, white and black. As I talk she shepherds her charges over the great fire. Then she paused momentarily. She lifted her head slowly revealing the strain pocked face and stared at me. Then she spoke slowly and with such feeling and intensity. I froze. “ Those big men and women never think about us. Do they? Here I am. A commoner. I sell this stuff. Been at it for years. Never travelled out of this country. These big wigs have seen the world and all they could give Ghana is this wretchedness?” I left with my stuff and an appetite that had gone gaga. Ordinary folk know that the Ghanaian elite have taken them for a ride. Failed them. It is a big pretense and a circus of power play, self aggrandizement, materialism and fork tongued deceit. I have been pondering her words ever since. Thought I will share it.
And share Ongayo’s too. A fellow academic from Kenya studying in Utrecht, Amsterdam. He is in Accra doing some fieldwork for his doctorate. His commentary on Accra is chilling. While we sat at lunch recently he thought he saw a country made up of two separate worlds: foul opulence in the face of grinding poverty. He said Kenya had reached that point and surpassed it. Ghana was getting there. In Kenya dudes with a Masters degree were mates in the matatus( their version of tro-tro). Crime executed with sophisticated weapons was rife in Kenya; G3s and others in that category were the weapons of choice. The rich live in barricaded enclaves with towering walls; beyond 6:00p.m.one dare not go out on some frolick. Ongayo has been in Accra several times and in the rural parts of Ghana too. Word.
And talking about Accra and beyond my first encounter with Sogakope was through the Hotel Cisneros some years back. This hotel rubs against the Volta literally. The Volta is so majestic and almost haughty. I still remember the boatman riding the Volta in that canoe. I waved. He returned my gesture. I admired his courage; tiny-tot upon this watery vastness. I think the reported destruction of some property of Sogakope Secondary School recently by some irate citizens was very bad publicity for a place I fell in love with. Hard earned national resources from the GETfund just went to waste because of some grievance. And the irony of it all was an elderly gentleman caught on camera justifying what took place. That senior citizen insulted us all. Where are the police? And the regional minister and the Regional Security Council? I want to see some arrests on this matter and swift punishment. After all these “vandals” also threatened to poison the water of this school. Such arrogance!!!! Impunity anywhere in our Republic cannot be allowed. I am watching closely.         


Monday 8 August 2011

Re: Re: Re:Re: IMANI Report

My rebuttal to IMANI; in blue!!!!!




Dear Sir,

1) I do not need to indicate that. In any case if our Republic's Armed Forces decide to go into commercial ventures I see no reason why they should and cannot.
 
That is neither to say that you believe, and can demonstrate, that this is a positive development nor that it will yield positive outcomes for the Republic, which is the only true test. Everything else is detail.
        
     I thought my position was unambiguous.
 

2) The technical and financial questions lie squarely with the Ghanaian Armed Forces to decide. You are not suggesting  that this institution simply jumped into the venture without taking into account these matters. At best as civil society and engaged citizens the key point would have been to enquire about whether due diligence had been done rather than the veiled(and patronizing) suggestion that the Army was bat blind in venturing into such an enterprise.
 
Sir, your reading of the tenets of accountability and probity in a constitutional dispensation is both quaint and arcane:-) It is NOT for the Armed Forces to decide. It is for the civilian Executive to decide, subject to any reviews by the other two arms of government. Where there is a manifest possibility that the public purse shall be unduly burdened there are actually statutes that govern what is permissible. We pointed out clearly, and factually, why the technical and financial partners that have been engaged may not be up to measure. If you have contrary evidence, kindly share same.

    I have not indicated or argued about any sacredness of the Ghanaian Army when it comes to critique. Do not play God on these matters of judgement. Interesting you use the word " believe".   

3)  You cannot be cute on this point. A synthesis of your piece morphs into this syllogistic argument:

 1) Global trends are having a deterministically positive effect on how militaries are interfacing with the market( Quotes from your piece: "This is indeed the thinking across the developed and middle-income world."Why is Ghana rushing to embrace a concept – that of military ownership and management of commercial ventures – when most countries are fleeing from this practice?"

 2) Ghana's army is not following this global trend as it goes commercial

 3) The Ghanaian army's investment is thus bound to go awry.

 Essentially your piece in a very veiled fashion suggested the " "mischaracterisation of "western" to mean "global." " In any case the literature clearly locates the source of the rise of market triumphalism in Western academies which the privatization of the military's industrial activities reflects. Your primary example of the USA under your " Global Trends"  sub-heading was a Freudian slip I guess ;)!!!!
 
We did nothing of the sort. We liberally cited the work of Dr. Siddiqa, whose work has focussed on the so-called "emerging world", and the ideational winds blowing in that universe.

       You are dodging the issues. Don't find refuge in Dr. Siddiqa. 

4) The lack of clarity is your fault not mine. My very public positions on these issues and my work show where I stand. I will not bore our esteemed readers. In any case your point blithely wish away the ideational power assymetries that characterize the flow of ideas in our contemporary world. Again to think about development on your terms in not the same as saying that the ideas that are thus spawned are unique; that was not my argument. You creating a straw man in order to obliterate it with an ICBM!!!! 
 
We are not sure which of our points you are referring to.

      Again that is your burden. 

5) "Our central thesis is that "ownership and direct management" by the armed forces has been proven less effective." How do you prove that conclusively? By what metrics? This what I am contending; this law like posturing is intellectually unsustainable. In any case do you have the full facts on these regarding what pertains in the US/UK etc. 
 
Please share any evidence you have that this central thesis is flawed. Your present position is glib but not very lucid:-) Our analysis clearly pointed to a global trend of military de-commercialisation.

       You seem seduced and inebriated by your own rightness and a certain tunnel vision. The WB itself is now after falling flat on its   face calling for public-private partnerships after demonizing the state sector in Africa and elsewhere. Go dig the literature(Ha-Joon Chang will be a useful primer).  

6)  So why did you not indicate what you consider  " mere bagatelle" in your piece so we can consider that and at the very least come to an informed position. Or you were playing a sophisticated "bagatelle" mind game? You cannot "suspect" with a public document that deals with the Armed Forces of the Republic of Ghana; an institution that with all her faults stands up to the very best on this globe.
 
Your approach is slef-contradictory. On the one hand you want these matters to be subjected to "critical analysis", on the other hand you consider every action of our Armed Forces sacrosanct. That is not a critical approach we are familiar with.

    The contradiction arises from misunderstanding what is crystal clear.  
 
7) and 8) You cannot comment on China's military and its relationship with their civilian counterparts in power shorn of that country's post-1919 history. It is not for nothing that every Chinese leader is head of the CMC. I think the military establishment holds the reins of power in China. Check out the Chinese constitution; in that light I will utilize a pragmatic approach in understanding the re-orienting of China's military- business relations than a trendy one. 
 
Of course the General Secretary of the Communist Party is also Head of the CMC. In every country in the world the Head of State is Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Again, this is irrelevant to the thrust of our argument in this particular context, which is that: "the Chinese State is bent on removing erstwhile military enterprises from the direct management control and ownership of the Chinese Armed Forces".

        A 10th grade government student knows this. I was urging a historical reading of China's evolving military policy or strategy(zhanlue in Mandarin). 
 
9) I insist that your piece was not balanced. You were fudging to push through you own understanding of things. If you said so I will not bat an eye-lid :)!!!

10) You are not suggesting that we simply read your piece perfunctorily. I  introduced a critical approach and did my deconstruction  surgically and that involved reading along the lines. In any case the issues you raise are situated in the whole privatization of military research, operations etc question. Question: IMANI will applaud if the government of Ghana sets up, manages and runs a corporation that produces say military boots?
 
No we are suggesting that when you introduce a critical dimension to this debate that you stick to it. Your present reactions are a bit all over the place, pardon the metaphor:-)

      My or your confusion? 
 
I acknowledge your public spirited-ness though I must add. Passing of the offer of two pesewas enriches me I guess ;)!!! Kitiwa biara nso a !!!!!
 
We are also unswerving admirers of your scholarly work. You are very kind, Sir.

     Being charitable is a virtue. I enjoyed this ;)!!! 

Re: Re: Re: IMANI Report


IMANI's response to my response to their response in red!!!!! Unedited version!!!


Dear Sir,

1) I do not need to indicate that. In any case if our Republic's Armed Forces decide to go into commercial ventures I see no reason why they should and cannot.
 
That is neither to say that you believe, and can demonstrate, that this is a positive development nor that it will yield positive outcomes for the Republic, which is the only true test. Everything else is detail.

2) The technical and financial questions lie squarely with the Ghanaian Armed Forces to decide. You are not suggesting  that this institution simply jumped into the venture without taking into account these matters. At best as civil society and engaged citizens the key point would have been to enquire about whether due diligence had been done rather than the veiled(and patronizing) suggestion that the Army was bat blind in venturing into such an enterprise.
 
Sir, your reading of the tenets of accountability and probity in a constitutional dispensation is both quaint and arcane:-) It is NOT for the Armed Forces to decide. It is for the civilian Executive to decide, subject to any reviews by the other two arms of government. Where there is a manifest possibility that the public purse shall be unduly burdened there are actually statutes that govern what is permissible. We pointed out clearly, and factually, why the technical and financial partners that have been engaged may not be up to measure. If you have contrary evidence, kindly share same.

3)  You cannot be cute on this point. A synthesis of your piece morphs into this syllogistic argument:

 1) Global trends are having a deterministically positive effect on how militaries are interfacing with the market( Quotes from your piece: "This is indeed the thinking across the developed and middle-income world."Why is Ghana rushing to embrace a concept – that of military ownership and management of commercial ventures – when most countries are fleeing from this practice?"

 2) Ghana's army is not following this global trend as it goes commercial

 3) The Ghanaian army's investment is thus bound to go awry.

 Essentially your piece in a very veiled fashion suggested the " "mischaracterisation of "western" to mean "global." " In any case the literature clearly locates the source of the rise of market triumphalism in Western academies which the privatization of the military's industrial activities reflects. Your primary example of the USA under your " Global Trends"  sub-heading was a Freudian slip I guess ;)!!!!
 
We did nothing of the sort. We liberally cited the work of Dr. Siddiqa, whose work has focussed on the so-called "emerging world", and the ideational winds blowing in that universe.

4) The lack of clarity is your fault not mine. My very public positions on these issues and my work show where I stand. I will not bore our esteemed readers. In any case your point blithely wish away the ideational power assymetries that characterize the flow of ideas in our contemporary world. Again to think about development on your terms in not the same as saying that the ideas that are thus spawned are unique; that was not my argument. You creating a straw man in order to obliterate it with an ICBM!!!! 
 
We are not sure which of our points you are referring to.

5) "Our central thesis is that "ownership and direct management" by the armed forces has been proven less effective." How do you prove that conclusively? By what metrics? This what I am contending; this law like posturing is intellectually unsustainable. In any case do you have the full facts on these regarding what pertains in the US/UK etc. 
 
Please share any evidence you have that this central thesis is flawed. Your present position is glib but not very lucid:-) Our analysis clearly pointed to a global trend of military de-commercialisation.

6)  So why did you not indicate what you consider  " mere bagatelle" in your piece so we can consider that and at the very least come to an informed position. Or you were playing a sophisticated "bagatelle" mind game? You cannot "suspect" with a public document that deals with the Armed Forces of the Republic of Ghana; an institution that with all her faults stands up to the very best on this globe.
 
Your approach is slef-contradictory. On the one hand you want these matters to be subjected to "critical analysis", on the other hand you consider every action of our Armed Forces sacrosanct. That is not a critical approach we are familiar with.
 
7) and 8) You cannot comment on China's military and its relationship with their civilian counterparts in power shorn of that country's post-1919 history. It is not for nothing that every Chinese leader is head of the CMC. I think the military establishment holds the reins of power in China. Check out the Chinese constitution; in that light I will utilize a pragmatic approach in understanding the re-orienting of China's military- business relations than a trendy one. 
 
Of course the General Secretary of the Communist Party is also Head of the CMC. In every country in the world the Head of State is Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Again, this is irrelevant to the thrust of our argument in this particular context, which is that: "the Chinese State is bent on removing erstwhile military enterprises from the direct management control and ownership of the Chinese Armed Forces".
 
9) I insist that your piece was not balanced. You were fudging to push through you own understanding of things. If you said so I will not bat an eye-lid :)!!!

10) You are not suggesting that we simply read your piece perfunctorily. I  introduced a critical approach and did my deconstruction  surgically and that involved reading along the lines. In any case the issues you raise are situated in the whole privatization of military research, operations etc question. Question: IMANI will applaud if the government of Ghana sets up, manages and runs a corporation that produces say military boots?
 
No we are suggesting that when you introduce a critical dimension to this debate that you stick to it. Your present reactions are a bit all over the place, pardon the metaphor:-)
 
I acknowledge your public spirited-ness though I must add. Passing of the offer of two pesewas enriches me I guess ;)!!! Kitiwa biara nso a !!!!!
 
We are also unswerving admirers of your scholarly work. You are very kind, Sir.

Re: Re: IMANI Report

Please find below my unedited point by point rebuttal of their point by point initial response!!!! 




Dear Sir,

1) I do not need to indicate that. In any case if our Republic's Armed Forces decide to go into commercial ventures I see no reason why they should and cannot.

2) The technical and financial questions lie squarely with the Ghanaian Armed Forces to decide. You are not suggesting  that this institution simply jumped into the venture without taking into account these matters. At best as civil society and engaged citizens the key point would have been to enquire about whether due diligence had been done rather than the veiled(and patronizing) suggestion that the Army was bat blind in venturing into such an enterprise.

3)  You cannot be cute on this point. A synthesis of your piece morphs into this syllogistic argument:

 1) Global trends are having a deterministically positive effect on how militaries are interfacing with the market( Quotes from your piece: "This is indeed the thinking across the developed and middle-income world."Why is Ghana rushing to embrace a concept – that of military ownership and management of commercial ventures – when most countries are fleeing from this practice?"

 2) Ghana's army is not following this global trend as it goes commercial

 3) The Ghanaian army's investment is thus bound to go awry.

 Essentially your piece in a very veiled fashion suggested the " "mischaracterisation of "western" to mean "global." " In any case the literature clearly locates the source of the rise of market triumphalism in Western academies which the privatization of the military's industrial activities reflects. Your primary example of the USA under your " Global Trends"  sub-heading was a Freudian slip I guess ;)!!!!

4) The lack of clarity is your fault not mine. My very public positions on these issues and my work show where I stand. I will not bore our esteemed readers. In any case your point blithely wish away the ideational power assymetries that characterize the flow of ideas in our contemporary world. Again to think about development on your terms in not the same as saying that the ideas that are thus spawned are unique; that was not my argument. You creating a straw man in order to obliterate it with an ICBM!!!! 

5) "Our central thesis is that "ownership and direct management" by the armed forces has been proven less effective." How do you prove that conclusively? By what metrics? This what I am contending; this law like posturing is intellectually unsustainable. In any case do you have the full facts on these regarding what pertains in the US/UK etc. 

6)  So why did you not indicate what you consider  " mere bagatelle" in your piece so we can consider that and at the very least come to an informed position. Or you were playing a sophisticated "bagatelle" mind game? You cannot "suspect" with a public document that deals with the Armed Forces of the Republic of Ghana; an institution that with all her faults stands up to the very best on this globe.

7) and 8) You cannot comment on China's military and its relationship with their civilian counterparts in power shorn of that country's post-1919 history. It is not for nothing that every Chinese leader is head of the CMC. I think the military establishment holds the reins of power in China. Check out the Chinese constitution; in that light I will utilize a pragmatic approach in understanding the re-orienting of China's military- business relations than a trendy one. 

9) I insist that your piece was not balanced. You were fudging to push through you own understanding of things. If you said so I will not bat an eye-lid :)!!!

10) You are not suggesting that we simply read your piece perfunctorily. I  introduced a critical approach and did my deconstruction  surgically and that involved reading along the lines. In any case the issues you raise are situated in the whole privatization of military research, operations etc question. Question: IMANI will applaud if the government of Ghana sets up, manages and runs a corporation that produces say military boots?

I acknowledge your public spirited-ness though I must add. Passing of the offer of two pesewas enriches me I guess ;)!!! Kitiwa biara nso a !!!!!

Best
lloyd

Re: IMANI REPORT


Please find below IMANI's response to my risposte(unedited)

Dear Sir -
May thanks for taking time out of your very busy schedule to comment.

1. It is not entirely clear if you support the entry of our armed forces into commercial, for-profit, enterprises.

2. As we point out, on a priority scale, especially for a military establishment struggling to find its feet with respect to its own operational and maintenance affairs, a new function of raising finance and establishing factories does not seem like a vital need. Your view on this is neither clear nor instructive. We also note that you sideline the comments we made about the financial and technical details of this specific undertaking in favour of general concepts. Is it that you're comfortable with what we have revealed to be the case?

3. When we mentioned "global trend", we were here careful to provide a thorough cross-section of regional experience - Africa, Asia, Europe, South America and North America. We are not naive about the frequent mischaracterisation of "western" to mean "global" in certain parts of the development literature and its critiques.

4. It is not clear if your position is that any country has developed without learning from the experiences of others in its geopolitical neighbourhood, beyond its own geopolitical orbit, or at the same level of its historical threshold. Whether the experience-sharing proceeds north-south, south-south, or cross-hemispheric, the process of development relies on experience -sharing. You do not suggest an alternative model for "learning" on the part of a young, undercapitalised, economy striving for economic "emancipation". To the extent that we have used "global" to mean global in its true sense, we are inclined to take you up on your offer to point to us any country that has nurtured a development narrative that was truly "unprecedented".

5. We never suggest that "de-commercialisation" implies a wall of separation between the military and the financial and industrial system which capitalises its capacities. In several places, we point to an intermingling. Our central thesis is that "ownership and direct management" by the armed forces has been proven less effective. We clearly also mention that both the "civilian-state" and "private sector" have elsewhere been seen as alternatives to military ownership and management.

6. Once again, you reserved your determination with respect to whether you support direct military management and ownership or not.

7. Your point about Huawei is in the above light non-sequitur. We acknowledge without prompting that there is indeed a range of interactions between the civilian defence complex and the military. Just as Kongsberg, Lockheed, EADS etc are all interlocked with the cvilian defence establishment in their western perches, we can only suspect that Huawei, ZTE, and the rest maintain strong relationships with their country's military establishment. That point is mere bagatelle, per se.

8. You use the word "superficial" but do not go ahead to clarify if that means the civilian elite in China do not intend to drive through these reforms. Throughout your response, we encounter sweeping statements in rebuttal of certain points we have made without the accompanying re-education. Is it your position that the civilian elite in China does not want to keep the PLA out of business? Or something else?

9. You then make the bizarre point that we absolve the private sector of sins against humanity. Sir, we do not address private security companies in our short piece. Perhaps, you can point us to the portion where we do? We restricted ourselves to civilian defence industries, and were very clear throughout about what we are referring to. We struggle to appreciate your point about PMCs in this context.

10. Your conclusion about our view of the "state's involvement" in military production was rushed. We distinguish between military ownership/management and civilian (both state and private sector) ownership/control. We struggle to appreciate how you could have missed the conflation of private sector and state within the "civilian" category throughout the text. Was it a case of your having "read between the lines"? In this case, however, there is nothing in our text to ground your suspicions, and it is a bit careless for a scholar of your stature to extrapolate so liberally:-)

Your eloquence notwithstanding, Sir, we would on this occasion pass on your offer of "two pesewas":-)

Blessed sabbath.


IMANI

Sunday 7 August 2011

My Response to "IMANI Report: The Dangers of Military Commercialisation in Ghana"


 Dear Madam/ Sir,

Blackwater(now Xe) in its elements in Iraq  
Useful intervention(please see article below) I must say. I however find your central argument that Ghana desis
t from allowing the military from engaging in commercial activities on the basis of global trends dubious. The history of development shows that developing countries which bucked major global trends have been the most successful. You totally ignore the power(and the asymmetries there of) of definition and hence thought which such global trends(and dominant narratives for that matter) you seem enamored of encapsulate.

Your piece suggests obliquely that the free enterprise regime is so thorough in America that the military-industrial complex dances to its dictates. You have to refer to scholars like Block(2008) who demonstrates so convincingly how the American state is in fact very prominent in business and directly so(the genome project; the emergence of the PC etc). 

I think balance in your position is mortally wounded by the binary thinking in your piece couched as I distill it in the refrain:direct state role in military affairs bad; direct private sector role in military affairs good. Private Military Firms(PMFs)  and Private Security Contractors(PSCs) have become a very problematic component of contemporary military affairs. The sordid record of Black Water(now rechristened Xe) in Iraq is very public knowledge. Ghanaian scholar Aning(2001) has a critical piece on the PMCs and their role in Africa's internecine conflicts. The role of these firms in cahoots with major global media outlets in ensuring a perpetual state of panic and fear and insecurity to ensure their profits have led to theorisations in the literature on what has become known as the " narco-carceral complex" and the " disaster capitalism complex "( see Schack, 2011). So as Ghanaian scholar par excellence Paul Ansah used to quip: " no where cool!!!!"  Your take on China's military and de-commercialization is to my mind very superficial. Go figure out why Huawei was not allowed to buy up a major US firm recently. China's military has to date several direct very lucrative commercial interests.

In the long run it must be appreciated that development and national transformation are not a function of one -size fits all nomothetic approaches; in my humble view  a  better approach is one that is alert to " crossing the river by feeling the stones."   

My two pesewas!!!    

Best wishes
lloyd



IMANI Report: The Dangers of Military Commercialisation in Ghana
After our initial “alert”, we had resolved at IMANI not to comment again on the decision by the Ghana Armed Forces to set up a holding company as a mechanism for owning and running commercial enterprises.

It is clear that there has emerged a certain elite consensus about this matter, and to date no one has pointed us to an explicit law or regulation that prohibits the military from engaging in business with profit as the focus (let us not split hairs over the matter, commercial enterprises always have profit and monetary reward to shareholders as their cardinal objectives).
What is the point therefore of pushing the debate? Insofar as the political elite and the laws of the land appear united in purpose, all a civil society organisation like ours can do is point to the dangers ahead from an analytical point of view.
We are writing again on the subject because the debate that has arisen in the wake of the military’s announcement has not been rigorous. Our feeling, therefore, is that there is a good deal of factual evidence we can still share on this matter.
In the ultimate analysis, democratic accountability requires informed debate, and where that is lacking, we are called upon as a public interest organisation to comment.
This is not part of a campaign to undermine the aforementioned military industrialisation agenda.
We would have succeeded in our contribution to national progress if the public, as well as the elite, grow more aware of the hard facts and figures when finally they settle on the nuts and bolts of this “Defence Industrial Holding Company” concept.

Going Against Global Trend
One of our colleagues pointed out during a radio interview that Indonesia passed a law in 2004 requiring that the military divest its holdings in commercial enterprises by 2009.
Sadly, in the transcription of the interview “Indonesia” was replaced by “Malaysia”.
But Malaysia is interesting in its own right. The foremost defence-industrial entity in Malaysia is DEFTECH, which is very prominent in the development of military mobility platforms. DEFTECH is not owned by the Malaysian Armed Forces but by DRB-HICOM, a giant Malaysian conglomerate, of which the government of Malaysia holds less than 5.5%.
DEFTECH of course maintains excellent relations with the military. How else can it develop suitable technologies for them? We will return to the issue of military – industrial complexes later on. The primary point for now is that the military in Malaysia does not own or directly manage the country’s defence industries.
We have listened with growing alarm to a rising chorus suggesting in assertive terms that the plans of the Ghana Armed Forces to enter into industrial financing and management are in keeping with a commonplace trend internationally.
This is not accurate.
Everywhere the military, either on its own accord or through prompting by the civilian elite, is in retreat from commercial ownership and management activity.
The mention of the Chinese experience as one of those supporting the new moves by Ghana’s Armed Forces is especially surprising.
It is common knowledge that as far back as 1998 China embarked on the “Five Mechanisms” reforms that removed supervision of military enterprises from the Central Military Commission and placed same under the State Council.
The Chinese civilian elite have driven the divestiture of several enterprises with a view to removing them from military control. A detailed report for the United States - China Economic & Security Review Commission by James Mulvenon and Rebecca Tyroler-Cooper in October 2009 assembles the evidence from a diverse array of literary sources to establish how strongly privatisation and divestiture from military ownership and managerial control have emerged as key objects of military transformation in China.
Another country that has been mentioned is Argentina.
Yes, it is true that the military governments that for many years ruled the South American country put in place a massive commercial base between 1941 and 1983, so that by the early 80s they controlled a large swathe of Argentina’s economy, and accounted for as much as 12% of the national budget.
As Miguel Angel Centeno, who is no critic of the military-industrial complex per se, has recorded, by the mid-80s, divestiture of the famous Fabricacio­nes Militares set in motion a process of military de-coupling from commercial enterprise that reached a climax in the 90s and today has left the military in Argentina largely focussed on its area of primary competence, national defence.
Everywhere you look, in Russia, Spain, Chile (where military corruption in the copper sector became a source of deep worry for some political economists), and even in North Africa, the realisation has dawned that mixing the military and business is not a good idea.
Even Israel, which is in every respect a special case for historical reasons, has taken steps since the 90s to divest many enterprises once controlled by the Israeli Defence Forces to the civilian-state or private sectors. Even the vaunted Israeli Aircraft Industries (IAI) and Raphael Development Agency have been stripped of their erstwhile military control.
At this stage it is best to point out a nuance. “Military Industry” and “Military-controlled industry” does not really mean the same thing.
Military or defence industries develop and produce goods and services used predominantly by the military. Military-controlled industries on the other hand may be involved in a wide range of businesses not all of which may be producing to satisfy military and security needs.
It is perhaps understandable that historically the military has had an interest in military industries, properly described, in view of the perceived sensitivity of these industrial interests.
Indeed, it was the sensitivity attending the development of such items as stealth technology, missile systems, radar and, once upon a time, the internet, that most justified military involvement in commercial enterprise, and not some notion of military discipline, efficiency or uprightness.
When it comes to military control of enterprises in sectors such as banking, consumables, and intensive agriculture, there is very little by way of sound historical antecedent. Generally, military governments set these up in an effort to develop a domain with limited civilian oversight.
The references that have been made in the recent debate to Nigeria’s defence industries should be seen in this context.
The Defence Industries Corporation (DICON) of Nigeria, begun with a focus on producing small arms and ammunition, an objective very much in keeping with the historical justification provided in the preceding paragraphs. The entire technological base of DICON was imported from West Germany, and an initial team of West German technologists was brought in to develop the company’s technical competence.
By 1972 (8 years after it was set up), DICON had been declared officially bankrupt, and it general manager declared a wanted man. Nigeria was importing nearly a $1 billion worth of arms in the 70s and up to $1.5 billion in the 80s whilst DICON was justifying its restructuring and survival on its continued ability to produce rural water systems that rarely left their warehouses into the community.
Today, there is universal acceptance that the DICON model has been a failure, its factories more noted as sites for industrial accidents rather than ground-breaking innovations. In May 2011, the Defence Minister, Prince Kayode, hinted of the Nigerian government’s intention to embrace sound commercial principles in the running of the moribund DICON.
It is curious that Nigeria’s DICON is being cited today in Ghana as an example to emulate.

Dinosaurs
We don’t deny that there are still some countries where what the Ghana Armed Forces is promoting remains somewhat still in vogue. Iran, Cuba, Vietnam and North Korea are the best examples of countries that have until recently defied the military de-commercialisation trend.
All these countries for historical reasons have another reason to support military industrialisation. Persistent sanctions and/or antagonism with the West have shut their military from global procurement chains.
Also worth taking into account is how certain socialist legacies have defined many national examples of Asian and Latin American military-industrialisation, as Andrew Scobell so lucidly points out in his 2000 paper.
As soon as these historical constraints eased, however, some of these “recalcitrant” countries embarked on a process of military de-commercialisation in tandem with the rest of the world.
For example, in January 2007, the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Communist Party passed a resolution at its fourth plenum ordering the Vietnamese military to divest itself of all commercial enterprises. The reforms began almost immediately. The Central Committee cited a continuing incompatibility between the ethos of a national military and a focus on success in the commercial marketplace.

The Global Trend
There is no denying the fact that in every country the military exerts some economic influence through the military budget. Where defence spending is low there is a corresponding weakness in the military’s economic influence.
The most durable and sustainable approach to civil – military economic relations globally however has been through various procurement and R&D channels.
The United States Military, for instance, has a budget of $700 billion. The US is in fact responsible for nearly half of global arms spending.
The Research & Development (R&D) and procurement sub-budget alone exceeds $220 billion. The rest of the money goes into operations, maintenance and personnel welfare and salaries.
Clearly, through its research activities, procurement and general spending in the economy, the US Military is likely to exert a strong influence on many industries and could, through intelligent spending decisions, spur growth in whole sectors.
Using procurement and R&D the military is frequently able to influence the direction of private enterprises. The investment decisions and search for ideas undertaken by such private enterprises then align with military expenditure patterns for good or ill.
Military R&D (whether it is the internet, radar or GPS) is conventionally spun off to either the civilian-state or private sector for mass deployment or commercialisation.
Several federal regulations are in place to further ensure that small businesses in the US benefit from the military budget.
All this notwithstanding, the United States Military does not develop and operate commercial ventures. Most crucially, it does not own the industries that supplies it with its needs, licenses its research output or benefit from its spending.
The United Kingdom’s military-industrial complex follows a similar logic. The military exerts influence through its R&D and procurement functions and leaves the private sector to handle production, management and finance. Indeed the 2005 Defence Industrial Strategy of the United Kingdom’s Ministry of Defence explicitly mentions Research and procurement as the main levers for influencing the growth of the complex and positively impacting the national economy. Such national champions as BAE are not military-owned or controlled.
This is indeed the thinking across the developed and middle-income world.
Convention explicitly proscribes the engagement of the armed forces in commercial activity in much of the democratic world.
Why is this the case though?

Why the Military Should Steer Clear of Business
Ayesha Siddiqa points out in his insightful “Military Inc” monograph that military engagement in business disrupts discipline by creating an avenue for senior military officers to focus on material gain through their interaction with civilian contractors and financiers rather than on “force cohesion”. Using copious examples from Pakistan, Indonesia, and Egypt it is amply demonstrated that corruption is an inevitable canker when a regimental institution is invited to sample the profit motive. What evolves is a complete clash of values.
This was in fact amply evident in Ghana during the military rule years when military officers were put in charge of the chit system, and asked to oversee the distribution of so-called “essential commodities”. The infamous “fa wo to begye gulf” syndrome emerged as a direct outcome of this practice.
In Egypt and Thailand, corruption in the military has often reached an extent where state security itself has been threatened. Using the “non-disclosure of classified secrets” pretence, workers in Egyptian army controlled factories, such as the grand “99”, are prevented from striking, managers are forced to cook books and civilian oversight is rebuffed with impunity.
In Pakistan, parliamentary concerns about military businesses are routinely ignored by an officer caste emboldened by shadowy sources of finance.
Dr. Siddiqa, who has studied the subject of military involvement in business extensively, concludes emphatically that in states where institutions are young and still forming, military involvement in business necessarily leads, over time, to a predatory attitude, in which “national security sensitivity” is used to undermine accountability, civilian oversight and fair competition in the marketplace.
An avenue is created for military officers and others in the defence establishment to be directly exposed to the darker underbellies of business, something their training makes them inadequate to properly navigate.
This is already evident in the discussion that has happened so far on the airwaves. The civilian elite feels restrained from asking critical questions about the technical and financial cogency of the proposed DIHOC program. Will they be inclined to subject military-run enterprises to scrutiny when they are actually up and running and yielding benefits for the powerful officer class? Which political party will have the audacity to risk being labelled anti-military?
At any rate, financial autonomy for the military is in and of itself a dangerous thing. One of the mechanisms through which the civilian administration exercises oversight over the armed forces is via control of the military budget. Any attempt to provide resources “off-budget” to the armed forces can only erode that level of oversight and command control.
Already, the signs are ominous. No hint of this DIHOC concept was provided in the 2011 budget and supplement, and a public relations officer of the Armed Forces was quick to hint, darkly, that parliamentary scrutiny of the finances of DIHOC shall be unnecessary.
The other concern is that senior military officers should not be distracted from more fundamental duties. There are only so many officers available. Requiring that military officers or others in the defence establishment oversee civilian administrators and managers is requiring that they spend less time on military planning and logistics, training, and on the welfare of the troops. This has severe and adverse implications for “combat readiness”.
As Scobell recounts in his 2000 paper, a Chinese Artillery division in Nanjing was, prior to the reforms, so heavily involved in commercial pursuits that absenteeism nearly hit the 50%. This is, remember, an authoritarian quasi-communist country. Indeed, growing intolerance for growing attitudinal decay within the People’s Liberation Army was one of the main drivers for the 1998 reforms.
If military officers in Ghana were to be distracted by personal and group ambitions of succeeding in business, skilfully competing and/or collaborating with civilian counterparts, there is absolutely no doubt that the combat readiness of our troops shall suffer.
If on the other hand the vast majority of the tasks are to be left in the hands of civilian administrations, then what is the point of military involvement in the first place?
This raises the question of competence.
In many parts of the world, the experience clearly shows that the same things that make the military such an efficient fighting force make it an inefficient innovator and manager. The ability to tolerate deviancy, so crucial to creativity and innovation, and the open-mindedness to learn from subordinates and empower juniors, are all usually missing even within the modern armed forces.
Already, some of the decisions being taken with respect to DIHOC are suspect.
The first strategic partner they have named has neither the technical nor financial track record required to capitalise and run the first enterprise they have identified, the shoe factory. As we have said before there are only two companies that bears the name of that strategic partner in the Czech Republic. One is owned by the Chinese and has only $18,000 registration capital to its name, while the other is owned by a respected naturalised Ghanaian academic and his wife. Our understanding is that it is the latter that the military has engaged.
While the involvement of the Ghanaian academic is somewhat reassuring the company itself is only now building capacity in commercial engineering and has for most of its existence been grossly undercapitalised (approximately $6000 during its first decade after incorporation).
We have no doubt that the involvement of the company’s founder is helpful and it is encouraging that the company has now increased its registration capital to nearly $900,000, even if that still leaves its balance sheet less than robust. What is worrying is that the fund-raising strategy that has been adopted is vague (and therefore unlikely to excite investors) and weak. And the secrecy is not helping matters. But that of course is the issue: the military is not known for its transparency.
Why is Ghana rushing to embrace a concept – that of military ownership and management of commercial ventures – when most countries are fleeing from this practice?
If we had any influence on Ghana’s military planners, we would have argued instead for a renewed military focus on reducing its reliance on foreign experts and specialists in the maintenance of its existing plant and equipment.
There is a line item in the defence budget of nearly $9 million that goes to “defence advisors”. Our defence attaches in overseas missions are, as we know, primarily focussed on securing technical assistance for our armed forces. That is an area that can be radically improved through enhanced procurement and the development of an R&D culture within the armed forces. These are the priorities, we think.
Some will say that the “procurement” dimension is already evident in the shoe factory strategy since the factory shall be supplying boots for the security services. This is however wrong-headed.
Even if the armed forces were to follow the international norm of 3 boots per trooper per year, the roughly 20,000 annual boots’ requirement would be woefully inadequate to support the sales expectations of a $6 million plus factory. Even if all security forces in this country were to be mandated to source from this factory, it is unlikely that sales from those quarters would amount to 50,000, simply because the clothing needs of our security forces are not being met to international standards.
That means military procurement, in that very narrow sense, is completely inadequate to revitalise the operations of the shoe factory. The factory’s survival will be completely determined by its capacity to compete in the open market. In that regard, military ownership does not provide any especial advantage. Which, of course, is exactly our point.
From what we have been told, there is very little reassurance that the military is entering industries for which it has certain clear advantages or competences because of its procurement experience, core mandate or research potential. So what is the point here really?
Rather than conceiving the concept of “public-private partnership” within the context of establishing commercial, for-profit, enterprises, the military should look at enhancing its technical capacity through collaboration with the private sector, and gradually using its procurement and maintenance functions to drive that collaboration towards positive economic outcomes for the country.
As we have said already, we are not embarking on a public campaign to discredit DIHOC or to incite public opinion against the project. In fact we hope - notwithstanding all the evidence against DIHOC’s viability - this new experiment in our industrialisation journey shall work to the benefit of our troops and the ordinary people of this country.
Once again we wish the proponents luck.
Credit: IMANI Ghana (syndicated through www.Africanliberty.org)